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Abstract: This paper investigates the tensions brought forth when transnational 
identities are juxtaposed against claims of multiculturalism and de facto 
assimilation processes. The paper focuses on the resettlement of co-ethnics who 
arrived in China under forced migration circumstances during 1949-1979 and the 
generational transitions of their progeny. The Chinese state resettled these forced 
migrants from Southeast Asia in state-owned farms known as the overseas Chinese 
farms and gave them preferential treatment as ‘returnees’ rather than ‘refugees’. 
They retained transnational cultural identities that set them apart from the China-
born Chinese and suffered further stigmatisation during the Cultural Revolution. 
The paper signals the limitations of using ethnicity as a lens for understanding how 
‘difference’ is negotiated in China. In contemporary times the (multi)cultural 
identities of the refugee-returnees are promoted as tourism features to help reinvent 
the farms for economic sustainability. Yet the identity transitions experienced by 
the progeny of the refugee-returnees suggests they are assimilating into a national 
identity that subsumes their overseas Chinese cultures, serving to normalize a 
Chinese identity associated with the locally born Chinese instead. The paper argues 
that the objectification of overseas Chinese heritage and an assimilation ideology 
work together to highlight China’s historical connections to its co-ethnics abroad 
selectively while simultaneously projecting a new national narrative of 
contemporary Chinese identity that is distinct from the overseas Chinese. This 
paper on Chinese forced migration and resettlement provides useful insights 
concerning transnational identity negotiations with respect to multiculturalism and 




From 1949-1979 China received three inflows of Chinese diasporic descendants1 that had 
left Southeast Asia under forced migration circumstances. Under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention they could have been considered ‘refugees’ (nanqiao), as were their 
counterparts accepted by asylum countries like Australia, the United States and in 
Europe. However, China labelled those that arrived on its shores during that period as 
ethnic Chinese ‘returnees’ (henceforth ‘refugee-returnees’) for political and policy 
reasons that will be explained in this paper. China resettled them in farm clusters known 
as the huaqiao nongchang, translated literally as the ‘overseas Chinese farms’ but known 
officially as the Farms for Returned Overseas Chinese. While it is difficult to ascertain 
the degree to which these forced migrants returned involuntary or voluntarily, the 
decision by the Chinese state to categorise them as ‘returnees’, even though they have not 
lived there before, signals the privilege of co-ethnicity. Also resettled alongside the 
refugee-returnees were other overseas Chinese who returned voluntarily from the early 
1950s onwards because of patriotism towards China, but they were sent to the overseas 
Chinese farms by the Chinese state as a result of  resettlement policies enforced during 
that time. These groups of involuntary and involuntary migrants came to be categorised 
as guiqiao (i.e. an abbreviation of guiguo huaqiao which refers to overseas Chinese 
returnees). Many had been born and bred abroad rather than in China. They identified as 
Chinese diasporic descendants from Southeast Asia and maintained transnational cultural 
identities even as they re-built their lives in post-1949 China during which the 
Communist government sought to instill a strong national identity premised upon Han 
Chinese norms in xinzhongguo (‘new China’).2 
 
Debates on managing ethnic diversity in China have focused predominantly on cultural 
and language rights for the identifiable minority ‘nationalities’. Officially it is recognised 
that China is a multi-ethnic country populated by the majority Han Chinese as well as 56 
ethnic minority groups (known in China as ‘nationalities’ or shaoshu minzu3). However, 
numerous scholars have identified the tense relationship between inculcating a national 
identity privileging Han Chinese norms and attempts to provide recognition for ethnic 
                                                
1 The label, ‘huaqiao’, is often used to describe the overseas Chinese but this term  simplifies differences 
between distinct groups of Chinese living abroad. Diasporic descendants refer to the Chinese that were 
born and grew up abroad; they have absorbed other cultural influences from their socialisation abroad but it 
is intermingled with a lingering Chinese identity. Some still have Chinese nationality but many have 
adopted the citizenship of the countries in which their parents settled. Another group of overseas Chinese 
were born and bred in China but migrated later in life. They maintain a strong Han Chinese national 
identity with most still choosing to retain their Chinese nationality because they plan to return to China 
after their sojourn abroad; Leo Suryadinata, ‘China’s citizenship law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia’ in 
Michael B. Hooker, Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Singapore, ISEAS, 2002, pp. 169–202 
2  However efforts to promote an overarching national identity privileging Han Chinese norms can be 
traced back to the Republican era and these continued into the Communist period. 
3 In Mandarin, minzu can refer to nationality, ethnicity or people more generally. For the fluidity of social 
groups categorised as ‘nationalities’ in China, see Nicholas Tapp, In defence of the archaic: A 
reconsideration of the 1950s ethnic classification project in China, Asian Ethnicity, 3, 2001, pp. 63-84; also 
Christopher Vasantkumar, What is this ‘Chinese’ in overseas Chinese? Sojourn work and the place of 
China’s minority nationalities in extraterritorial Chineseness, The Journal of Asian Studies, 71, 1, 2012, pp. 
423-446. 
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diversity in China.4 They argue that claims of cultural plurality gloss over assimilation 
processes that are at work in China. For example, Han migration to minority regions has 
been taking place in the name of modernisation and development.5 This led to the 
widespread use of Mandarin rather than minority languages in these regions and 
increased competition for jobs and other resources, thus straining relations between the 
Han migrants and minority groups.  
 
As in other countries, transnational migration further complicates China’s attempts to 
manage diversity. The return of diasporic descendants and the difficulty they had gaining 
cultural acceptance by the Han Chinese majority who has never left China signals the 
limitations of using ethnicity as the primary lens for understanding the way ‘difference’ is 
negotiated and managed in China. The diasporic descendants from Southeast Asia 
described in this paper are ethnic Chinese born and bred abroad thus they have 
incorporated cultural habits, languages and attitudes that are distinct from the Chinese 
that have never left China.  
 
While countries like Australia, Canada and Singapore have turned to multiculturalism as 
a political and policy tool towards managing cultural diversity, China has been reticent 
towards adopting this approach despite its internal ethnic diversity and the complex 
transnational migration inflows and outflows populating its society in the past and 
present. Yet, as this paper shows, claims to multiculturalism have been invoked for 
economic gains from the 1980s onwards since political and economic reforms took place 
on the overseas Chinese farms. Such framings of Chinese identity and multiculturalism 
make selective historical connections with Chinese co-ethnics abroad while 
simultaneously creating a new national narrative about contemporary China that sets it 
apart from the overseas Chinese. These insights on the historical return of co-ethnics 
abroad, subsequent multiculturalism framings and contemporary Chinese identity are 
useful for understanding China in transition now as other types of diasporic descendants 
converge in the country today to live, study or work in 'immigrant China' (Pieke, 2012).  
 
The next section sets out the research methodology informing this paper. Following that, 
the paper considers the wider literature on cultural identities and generational transitions. 
Then the paper presents the case of the overseas Chinese farms, arguing that the 
transnational identities of the refugee-returnees exist in uneasy co-existence with claims 
of multiculturalism promoted by leaders of the overseas Chinese farms who are keen to 
reinvent the farms into tourism destinations. The penultimate section further 
problematises such claims of multiculturalism by suggesting that the second and third 
generations are experiencing assimilation processes that subsume the transnational 
identities of their parents and grandparents. The conclusion reiterates the key arguments 
                                                
4 Dru C. Gladney, Representing nationality in China: Refiguring majority/minority identities, The Journal 
of Asian Studies, 53, 1, 1994, pp. 92-123; Elena Barabantseva, Change vs. order: Shijie meets Tianxia in 
China’s interactions with the world, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 34, 2, 2009, pp. 129-155; 
Anthony Howell and Cindy Fan, Migration and inequality in Xinjiang: A survey of Han And Uyghur 
migrants in Urumqi, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 52, 1, 2011, pp. 119-139. 
5 Howell and Fan, Migration and inequality in Xinjiang, p. 2011. 
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of the paper and suggests future directions for research on integration and assimilation as 
well as overseas Chinese studies. 
 
Methodology 
This paper is based on research conducted from 2010-2013. While the arguments are not 
meant to be representative of all the overseas Chinese farms in China, it reveals insights 
on forced migration histories, resettlement processes and intergenerational change that 
help us develop a clearer understanding of not only a phenomenon that is little known 
outside of Mainland China but also integration and assimilation debates in contemporary 
China. The research design draws on, first, analyses of Chinese language newspaper 
articles, federal and local government circulars, and academic articles (1994-2010) 
focusing on the overseas Chinese farms. Second, semi-structured interviews were carried 
out with the inhabitants of two overseas Chinese farms in Southern China. The interviews 
lasted for forty-five to sixty minutes and the questions revolved around their motivations 
for relocating to China, resettlement experiences, family relations, and the impact of farm 
reforms. While earlier fieldwork visits mainly sought out the original cohorts of refugee-
returnees to uncover their oral histories of return and resettlement in China, subsequent 
visits began to examine the experiences of the second and third generations to understand 
processes of intergenerational change. 
 
Third, follow-up interviews were conducted with former inhabitants of the farms that 
have left to settle in Chinese cities. While some of these respondents were contacted 
through personal networks, others are members of ‘friendship associations’ (lianyihui) set 
up by out-migrants from those farms. These associations function as a means for the out-
migrants to stay in touch with one another and with those who remain behind in the 
farms. The  associations organise social events and cultural performances to showcase the 
distinctive guiqiao identities represented by the overseas Chinese farms; most of the 
events are held in China but some groups have performed in overseas destinations as part 
of cultural exchanges.  
 
Forty-two interviews were carried out in total. Numerous more unstructured interviews 
took place during ethnographic observation opportunities, which include home 
visitations, dinner occasions and participating in social events to which we have been 
invited. The interviews were not recorded in audio form at the request of the participants. 
Detailed field notes were taken of the ethnographic observations as well as the 
interviews. Ethnographic observation and interviews were chosen over surveys because 
this study is interested to uncover the oral histories and nuances of life on the overseas 
Chinese farms that qualitative methods are best suited to draw out.  
 
One of the farms was established in 1963 and accommodates 3500 refugee-returnees. The 
other farm was built in 1951 and it has 13 500 refugee-returnees. The majority of the 
inhabitants in both farms originate from Indonesia, Malaya and Vietnam. The main crop 
on the smaller farm is sugarcane while the other farm has a more diversified agricultural 
base, including coffee and cocoa. However, declining demand and falling commodity 
prices mean that tourism is being developed as an alternative revenue sector for both of 
these farms. The children and grandchildren of the refugee-returnees who remain on the 
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farm find employment mainly in the tourism industry. The farms and the cities in which 
research was carried out will not be named so as to ensure the anonymity of the research 
participants. 
 
The original cohorts of refugee-returnees are now in their sixties or older. The earlier 
ones from Malaya and Indonesia arrived in China as children or adolescents and are more 
accurately described as the 1.5-generation. Their parents, the pioneer refugee-returnees, 
have passed on but the Malayans and Indonesians we met on the farms still have vivid 
memories of their family forcedmigration histories and resettlement experiences. The 
Vietnamese-Chinese pioneers are now in old age. The children and grandchildren of the 
three groups mentioned here, namely the second and third generations born in China or 
who arrived without personal memories of life abroad, span the twenties to thirties age 
group.  
 
Forced migration, cultural diversity and generational transitions 
In a seminal paper on the sociology of forced migration, Castles 6  observes that 
discussions on forced migration are closely linked to national concerns of border control 
and national security. Embedded within are debates on how forced migrants should 
integrate into the national community and adopt its national identity. Forced migrants 
usually come from a cultural background considered different from the ‘mainstream’ 
population in the country where they have settled. As such, forced migrants are subject to 
integration and assimilation ideals promoted by nation-states. While similar processes are 
observable in China, a foray into the existing scholarship on cultural diversity approaches 
and its applicability to China suggests several disconnects too.  
 
First, the fertile literature on integration and assimilation approaches focuses primarily on 
the experiences of Chinese immigrant populations abroad, especially in Southeast Asia 
and North America. The well-cited work of Portes and Zhou7 (1993) on segmented 
assimilation8, for example, is based on the American ‘melting pot’ model. They suggest 
that children of immigrants will take distinctive pathways towards occupational 
segmentation depending on the socio-economic status of their parents and the extent to 
which they acculturate into a white middle-class society. Zhou’s later work applies this 
conceptual framework to a study of Asian second generation immigrants, including the 
Chinese9. The assimilation variables they study include language, ethnic identification 
and sense of belonging; these aspects of assimilation will also be discussed in the 
empirical analyses of this paper. A related body of work by Rambaut and Alba and Nee10 
                                                
6 Stephen Castles, Towards a sociology of forced migration and social transformation, Sociology, 77, 1, 
2003, pp. 13-34.  
7 Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants, 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 530, 1, 1993, pp. 74-96. 
8 They posit three trajectories of assimilation: upwards into a higher socio-economic class through 
acculturation and integration, downwards into a lower socio-economic class or economic advancement 
through preservation of unique ethnic traits.  
9 Min Zhou and Sao Xiong Yang, The multifacted American experiences of the children of Asian 
immigrants: Lessons for segmented assimilation, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28, 6, 2005, pp. 1119-1152. 
10 Rubén Rambaut, ‘Ties that bind: Immigration and immigration families in the United States’ in Alan 
Booth, Ann C. Crouter and Nancy Landale, Immigration and the Family: Research and Policy on U. S. 
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(1999) argue that social actors negotiate the incorporation process in non-linear ways, 
depending on the contextual factors involved.  
 
In comparison to assimilation theories, studies of Chinese immigrant populations in 
Canada focus on the way they fare under state-sponsored integration processes, usually in 
the form of multicultural policies that advocate cultural pluralism. Critics argue, 
nonetheless, that Chinese immigrants are subject to de facto assimilation processes 
despite claims to multiculturalism in Canada.11 Similar debates characterise the literature 
on integration and assimilation processes in Southeast Asia12, which will be discussed 
later in this section.  
 
Second, where analyses of integration and assimilation are applied to China this is 
usually made with reference to ethnic minority ‘nationalities’ (see footnote 1). Such 
studies debate the extent to which ethnic minority claims for autonomy have been met or 
if they are subject to assimilation processes. Ma (2008:2002), for example, argues against 
the ‘politicisation’ of ethnic minorities and supports a ‘culturalisation’ policy instead. 
Here, he suggests that the Chinese state’s approach has been to institutionalise ethnic 
difference and provide minority rights that will reinforce separatist tendencies. Instead, 
Ma (2008:208-210) supports political unity at the national level and a cultural pluralism 
that is akin to what he refers as the ‘acculturation’ model in the United States in which 
ethnicity has been ‘depoliticised’. The claims made by Ma are contentious, not least its 
claim that ethnicity in the United States has been depoliticised, but also because of the 
white-Anglo assimilation tendencies in the United States model that, if translated into the 
Chinese context, would privilege Han Chinese norms inadvertently.  
 
Moreover, Ma’s arguments sidestep the more critical question of what is Chinese national 
identity? While the cultural hegemony of the Han Chinese hold sways currently, Han 
Chinese culture is also characterised by heterogeneous sub-cultures and dialects. Scholars 
such as Gladney and Mullaney13 further remind us that it is by categorizing, objectifying 
and commodifying minority identities that  the normalization of Han majority identity is 
enabled. 
 
Third, related to the above are debates on transnationalism that have been applied to 
Chinese communities within and outside of China. The transnational identities borne by 
the overseas Chinese have been the subject of numerous studies on the huaqiao (overseas 
Chinese) abroad and also the qiaoxiang (hometowns of the overseas Chinese) in China. 
The influence of European and Southeast Asian architectural styles on the qiaoxiang, 
such as the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Kaiping Diaolou, is well documented by 
                                                                                                                                            
Immigrants, Mahwah, NJ, Erlbaum, 1997, pp. 3-46; Richard Alba and Victor Nee, ‘Rethinking assimilation 
theory for a new era of immigration’, in Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz and John Dewind, The 
Handbook of International Migration, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1999, pp. 137-160. 
11 Peter Li, Deconstructing Canada’s discourse of immigrant integration, Journal of International 
Migration and Integration, 4,  3,  2003, pp. 315‒33. 
12 For example, Suryadinati, 1997. 
13 Gladney, Representing nationality in China, pp. 110; Thomas S. Mullaney, Coming to terms with the 
nation: Ethnic classification in modern China, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California 
Press, 2011. 
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Mainland Chinese scholars like Mei and Zhang.14 The persistent transnational identities 
of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia despite integration and assimilation pressures 
by postcolonial nation-states has also been studied widely by Mainland Chinese and 
international scholars.15 They argue that the overseas Chinese retain their ethnic identities 
even as they adapt to the local societies in which they have settled, such as in the case of 
the Peranakan Chinese in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore who intermarried with the 
locally born Indonesians or Malays. 
 
This review of the literature on integration, assimilation and transnationalism with respect 
to Chinese migration and China illuminates a jarring conceptual gap that this paper 
addresses. How may integration and assimilation debates be used to analyse transnational 
communities within China? This paper examines this question with respect to the earlier 
cohorts of refugee-returnees resettled on the overseas Chinese farms as well as the 
generational transitions taking place on the farms. The refugee-returnees retained their 
transnational cultural identities even as they rebuilt their lives in China as guiqiao. The 
paper argues that while their transnational identities bearing Southeast Asian influences 
were once met with disapproval before and during the Cultural Revolution period, it is 
today capitalised upon for ethnic tourism ventures in the name of multiculturalism. 
Nonetheless, the extent to which these farm communities are multicultural is debatable 
and the paper further suggests that indications of assimilation trends are observable 




The Chinese state accepted three key cohorts of ethnic Chinese diasporic descendants, 
mostly under conditions of forced migration during 1949-1979.16 The Malayan-Chinese 
arrived first in China (1949-1953). Some had been compelled to leave British-ruled 
Malaya because of anti-communist sentiments whereas others returned voluntarily to the 
ancestral homeland during the patriotism fervour following the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China. The latter, nonetheless, became allocated to the state-owned Overseas 
Chinese Farms subsequently. The return of the Malayans was followed by groups of 
Indonesian-Chinese fleeing anti-Chinese hostilities in post-independence Indonesia 
                                                
14 Weiqiang Mei, Kaiping huaqiao yu diaolou jianzhu, Journal of Wuyi University, 4, (2002), pp. 45-49; 
Yinglong Zhang, Some thoughts about the cultural characters of Guangdong Qiaoxiang: A comparative 
study of architectural culture of Wuyi And Chaoshan Qiaoxiang, Overseas Chinese History Studies, 3, 
2006, pp. 63-69.. 
15 See Gungwu Wang, China and the Chinese overseas, Singapore, Time Academic Press, 1991; Leo 
Suryadinati, Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, Singapore and London, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1997; Guotu Zhuang, Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, Shijie Minzu, 3, 2002, pp. 37-48; and 
Michael Jacobsen, Navigating between disaggregating nation states and entrenching processes of 
globalisation: Reconceptualising the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, Journal of Contemporary China, 
18, 2009, pp. 69-91. 
16 See Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese: Perceptions and Policies, China Quarterly, 44, 
1970, pp. 1-37; Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking’s Changing Policy 
1949-1970, London and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1972; Michael Godley, A summer cruise 
to nowhere: China and the Vietnamese-Chinese in perspective, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 4, 
1980, pp. 35-59; and Michael Godley, The sojourners: Returned overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic 
of China, Pacific Affairs, 62, 1989, pp. 330-352. 
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(1959-69). The last cohort to arrive in China was the Vietnamese-Chinese (1978-1979) 
escaping tightening restrictions placed by the Vietnamese authorities on the Chinese 
population in Vietnam. These cohorts of Southeast Asian refugee-returnees are today in 
their sixties and seventies; most arrived in China as young children. Their children and 
grandchildren were born in China and the research suggests that the second and third 
generations have limited personal links with Southeast Asia even though they claim they 
identify as guiguo huaqiao (i.e. returnees with overseas ties).  
 
The Chinese state labelled the co-ethnic refugees from Southeast Asia as ‘returnees’, thus 
helping to legitimise an extraterritorial claim over these co-ethnics and the domestic 
preferential resettlement policies it provided for them.17 The Qiaoban (also known as the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office) took care of their resettlement and allocated the 
majority of them to permanent farm clusters known as the huaqiao nongchang or 
‘overseas Chinese farms’ (also known officially as the Farms for Returned Overseas 
Chinese). There are 84 such farms in total today, mainly concentrated in the coastal 
provinces of China but also around the Chinese provinces at the Sino-Vietnamese border. 
During the earlier years, the farm inhabitants could enjoy housing, farming equipment, 
food provisions and fixed salaries provided by the Chinese state regardless of their 
farming productivity. The farms contained factories, schools, hospitals and other 
facilities. Legislation passed in 1991 further protected the rights of the returnees and their 
dependents (guiqiao qiaojuan quanyi baohu fa), including the refugee-returnees. Despite 
these privileges, the refugee-returnees faced resettlement and integration difficulties as a 
result of sustained poverty and discrimination by the China-born Chinese that perceived 
them as culturally different. For example, the Indonesian refugee-returnees speak 
Indonesian languages amongst themselves, wear batik (an Indonesian textile pattern) 
attire and cook dishes using spices native to Southeast Asia, which they can cultivate in 
the tropical climate of southern China.18 
 
Economic and governance reforms during the 1980s impacted the farms in significant 
ways.19 Many farms became marketed as economic zones or tourism sites showcasing 
Southeast Asian architecture and culture in China.20 Around the same period, cities in 
southern China embarked on massive industrialisation. The Qiaoban contributed to this 
endeavour by recruiting promising youths from the overseas Chinese farms to work in 
state-owned enterprises newly set up in the cities. Strict migration controls at that time 
meant that in order to find employment outside of the farms, the employee would need 
documents proving that the danwei (work unit) had agreed to the transfer. Those who left 
under this state-led labour deployment policy (with the endorsement of the danwei) 
counted themselves fortunate because they could escape the harsh conditions of the rural 
farms. The out-migrants, many of them second generation youths who were born and 
                                                
17 Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, ‘Refugee’ or ‘returnee’? The ethnic geopolitics of diasporic resettlement in China 
and intergenerational change, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 38, 4, 2013, pp. 599–
611. 
18 Tan Chee-Beng, Reterritorialization of a Balinese Chinese community in Quanzhou, Fujian, Modern 
Asian Studies, 44, 3, 2010, pp. 547-566. 
19 Han Xiaorong, The demise of China’s overseas Chinese state farms, Journal of Chinese Overseas, 9, 
2013, pp. 33-58. 
20 Ho, ‘Refugee’ or ‘returnee’?, pp. 604-606. 
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bred in China, maintained personal ties in the farms with left-behind family members and 
through the activities of the friendship associations. The extent to which their children 
born into the third-generation retain this relationship with the farms is questionable 
though. 
 
The post-1980s economic reforms meant the overseas Chinese farms gradually became 
marketed as tourism attractions featuring pockets of multicultural communities in China. 
Domestic tourists looking for an inexpensive holiday but still desiring to experience less 
familiar cultural environments are the targeted audience. The tourism capital of the farms 
is realised by the transnational identities maintained by the refugee-returnees. To an 
extent Southeast Asian culture is still part of the identity and habitual lifestyles of the 
inhabitants, especially amongst the older generation. Our research trips to the farms were 
often met by invitations to partake of their Southeast Asian cultural heritage, such as 
visiting an Indonesian home-museum in which one family has put on display personal 
and donated artefacts collected over the years by the Indonesian-Chinese patriarch. The 
Malayan and Indonesian refugee-returnees still prepare cuisine influenced by Southeast 
Asian flavours such as spicy beef rendang (dry curry) or gulai nangka (a distinctive 
Indonesian curry made with jackfruit), while the Vietnamese regularly use fish sauce and 
lemongrass to enhance the flavour of their dishes. Those from similar linguistic groups 
also speak to one another in the Malay (the Indonesians and Malayans refer to it as 
Bahasa) or Vietnamese languages. 
 
These transnational identities allow official publications by the farms and their museum 
displays to highlight to visitors the diverse overseas origins of the farms’ inhabitants and 
their multicultural practices. One of the villages on the farm has been purposefully 
landscaped to showcase Southeast Asian architectural features, including signboards that 
point to the ‘Malaysian Garden’ or other sites of cultural interest. Large restaurants have 
been established in the farms to receive coaches ferrying Chinese domestic tourists keen 
to sample Southeast Asian cuisine while on a daylong visit to the farms. The farm 
inhabitants informed us that during the off peak (tourism) season Indonesian dance 
performances could be staged for our personal enjoyment at a cost of only 20 yuan 
(approximately 3 USD) for each audience member. Such efforts at marketing 
multiculturalism on the Overseas Chinese Farms are similar to ethnic tourism ventures in 
minority regions of China seen as a means to facilitate development.21  
 
Although historical connections with the overseas Chinese and forced migration histories 
are drawn selectively for tourism purposes, the objectification and commodification of 
the overseas Chinese and their Southeast Asian identities for domestic tourism serves to 
demarcate and normalize China-born Chinese identity from the overseas Chinese identity 
as well. This dual framing of overseas Chinese and China-born Chinese identity allows 
the assertion of a new national narrative that simultaneously recognises China’s ties with 
                                                
21 Gladney, Representing nationality in China, pp. 102; Li Yang, Geoffrey Wall, and Stephan L.J. Smith, 
Ethnic tourism development: Chinese government perspectives, Annals of Tourism Research, 35, 3, 2008, 
pp. 751–771; Su Xiaobo, The imagination of place and tourism consumption: A case study of Lijiang 
Ancient Town, China, Tourism Geographies, 12, 3, 2010, pp. 412–434. 
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its co-ethnics abroad while downplaying its co-dependency with the overseas Chinese 
community.  
 
Despite claims to multiculturalism as a lifestyle of the farm inhabitants, there are 
indications of simmering cross-cultural tensions. Deeper probing into the attitudes of 
some refugee-returnees revealed covert racisms towards their counterparts from 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia. For example, the Malayan and Indonesian refugee-returnees 
are prone to describe the Vietnamese that were resettled after them as poorer Southeast 
Asian counterparts who benefited disproportionately from the toil of the earlier cohorts. 
In another instance, one of the Malayan refugee-returnees that we interviewed expressed 
disdain towards Indonesians from Bangka whom he regards as particularly narrow-
minded. During the interview, it emerged that he came to China as a young boy with his 
parents in the late 1950s but during the Cultural Revolution his parents had been 
imprisoned because some Bangka-Indonesians accused them of anti-communist 
ideologies. The family became caught up in the political climate of that period, described 
by Peterson22 as: 
During the Cultural Revolution, all haiwai guanxi were regarded as contemptible, if 
not treasonous. Domestic overseas Chinese, because of their historically rooted and 
continuing close economic, social, and personal ties abroad, were an especially 
conspicuous target. Qiaojuan and guiqiao were denounced and at times persecuted 
as “enemies of the people”, and “foreign spies”…23 
 
In like manner, the family of the Malayan refugee-returnee interviewed suffered greatly 
as a result of similar accusations. The memories of those difficult times remain etched 
deeply in his memory even though he is now is in his sixties. Up till now, he wants little 
to do with the villagers in the farm who come from Bangka and responded to further 
questions about them with a disapproving sneer.  
 
Concerning the tourism development of the farms, the farm inhabitants expressed 
reservations over the sustainability of this economic strategy as a revenue-generating 
enterprise for the farms. As the research progressed through repeated visits, respondents 
from one of the farms gradually revealed that the farm’s tourism venture has been making 
losses for consecutive years. A respondent identifying as a second generation inhabitant 
said half-jokingly that the local cultural performance venue known as the fengqingyuan 
(‘cultural custom garden’; see Figure 1 for an example) ought to be renamed the 
fengrenyuan (‘madhouse’) because ‘the wages there are so low that it would be crazy to 
work there’. Another respondent told us that he had scratched away his house number on 
a signboard that pointed tourists to his home, presented by the tourism planners as an 
example of how the Southeast Asian refugee-returnees lived. He said the tourism 
planners had not obtain his permission to put his house number on the signboard and he 
felt like his family has been put on display like animals in a zoo.   
 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
                                                
22 Glen Peterson, Socialist China and the huaqiao, Modern China, 14, 3, 1988, pp. 309-335. 
23 Peterson, Socialist China and the huaqiao, p. 312. 
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Figure 1 Example of an abandoned performance venue modeled after Indonesian 
architectural style 
 
The discussion in this section shows that tourism planners have capitalised on claims to 
multiculturalism and diasporic consciousness to reinvent the overseas Chinese farms as 
revenue-generating ventures. However, the multiculturalism  featured is superficial and 
glosses over the tensions between plural cultural groups. It also trivialises and 
commodifies the Southeast Asian cultures represented on the farms. The next section 
further highlights how assimilation processes have subsumed the transnational cultural 
identities of the later generations.  
 
Generational transitions, assimilation processes 
Despite claims to multiculturalism, a prevailing Han Chinese national identity has 
absorbed aspects of the transnational cultural identities once embodied by the original 
cohorts of refugee-returnees. Visits to a local school in one of the farms showed that the 
school projects a multicultural educational environment for the students that come from 
the farm and neighbouring villages. The walls are decorated with colourful large 
information posters featuring Southeast Asian geographies, festivals and the multicultural 
cuisines of the farm’s refugee-returnees (see Figure 2). However, there is no mention of 
the difficult forced migration circumstances experienced by the earlier cohorts of 
refugee-returnees. The language of instruction in school is Mandarin and the only second 
language the school children learn is rudimentary English. The school principal divulged 
that children of new internal migrants and the locally born Chinese from villages in the 
vicinity make up the population composition of the school now. The grandchildren of the 
refugee-returnees, though likely to have returned to the farm to be cared for by their 
grandparents temporarily, usually move back to the cities to join their parents once they 
are of school-going age. This is because their parents want them to have a better 
educational environment in urban schools.  
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
Figure 2 The multicultural cuisine of the farm inhabitants  
as featured on an information board in the school 
 
 
Able-bodied adults from the farm have been out-migrating independently to prosperous 
Chinese cities to find employment (dagong) as peasant workers (nongmingong) after 
strict internal migration control was lifted in recent years. This mobility is different from 
the earlier labour deployment policy in which the Qiaoban, acting on behalf of state-
owned enterprises, sent the second generation youths to take up jobs in the cities. The 
later batch of out-migrants sometimes start small businesses selling cooked food, clothing 
or electronic items in the cities. Others take on low-paying jobs as factory workers or 
kitchen help through the recommendation of fellow villagers. Such waged work pays 
around 2000 yuan (300 USD) per month. These jobs are still considered better paying 
than what they would earn on the farm as cultural performers for the tourism venture. The 
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enterprising out-migrants that persevere save enough to buy a small apartment in the city 
and succeed in relocating their hukou status to the city.24 
 
But as Han25  documents, the nongmingong experience racialisation and discrimination in 
the cities on the basis of their physical comportment and ‘caste’ backgrounds. So life for 
the children of the refugee-returnees, unless they are in white-collar professions, is not 
easy outside of the farms too. Some in the younger generation are unable to endure the 
toil of working in the cities or have been retrenched from their jobs and they end up 
returning to the farm, waiting for their fellow villagers working in the cities to introduce 
them to new job opportunities. During conversations with youths who have returned 
under these circumstances, they confided that they are the subject of village gossip and 
scorn because they are seen to be ‘failed migrants’. Apart from the young adults who stay 
behind  to work in the farms, this is the other group of youths are still living in the farms 
but only because of their unsuccessful stint in the cities. 
 
Unlike the first-generation’s sentimental recounting of their lives in Southeast Asia, the 
second and third generations still remaining on the farms could tell us little about the 
countries their parents and grandparents had come from. They recognise their bicultural 
identities as Malayan-, Indonesian- or Vietnamese-Chinese but few have been to visit the 
countries their parent and grandparents had fled. Sometimes with a sheepish grin and at 
other times matter-of-factly, the Indonesian-Chinese and Vietnamese-Chinese youth 
would admit that they no longer speak Bahasa Indonesian or the Vietnamese language. 
They say in schools they had not been taught these languages since the language of 
instruction is Mandarin. At home they are unable to communicate with their older family 
members in Bahasa Indonesian or the Vietnamese language too. Few of the younger 
generation members we met on the farm have visited the Southeast Asian countries their 
parents or grandparents come from. This is not only a matter of travel expenses but also 
because they lack familiarity with those countries and they don’t speak the languages of 
those Southeast Asian countries anymore. In comparison, several of the older generation 
have returned to visit the countries they left. One Indonesian respondent in his seventies 
told us proudly, ‘it was  easy for me to get through immigration in Indonesia because I 
spoke Bahasa to the immigration officer. She even chatted happily to me for a while’.  
 
At a karaoke bar one evening, amidst the cacophony of a sing-a-long and caiquan games 
(a popular finger-guessing ritual accompanied by alcohol consumption), we asked one 
eighteen year old youth if he knows where his peers’ families had come from in 
Southeast Asia before they arrived in China. His lackadaisical reply was, ‘I don’t know 
and we are all guiqiao (returnees) so it doesn’t matter from which country we came’. 
Upon further probing he added, ‘when we are together we don’t ask each other things like 
this’. Indeed, his response is typical of the later generations who have little interest in 
                                                
24 As ‘returnees’, their parents had been entitled to the non-rural hukou (fei nongye hukou) therefore 
enabling their children to inherit this status that can be transferred to the cities if they are able to prove their 
long term urban residency. 
25Dong Han, Policing and racialisation of rural migrant workers in Chinese cities, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 33, 4, 2010, pp. 593-610. 
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family histories that pre-date their arrival in China. Due to their forced migration 
backgrounds and earlier societal and migration controls implemented by China, there is a 
period in which their family and cultural ties with Southeast Asia were severed. Unlike 
the older generation, they have little personal memories of family members remaining in 
Southeast Asia. This limits even the ‘emotional transnationalism’ described by Wolf26, in 
her study of second generation children of Filipino immigrants, that is characterised by 
sentimental relationships towards extended family members left in ‘the home that 
constitutes their parents and grandparents’ primary point of reference.’27  
 
One parent, himself a Malayan returnee who is married to a Vietnamese returnee, related 
bitterly, ‘my children don’t want to listen to our stories when we try to tell them about the 
difficulties we faced. They say to us “do you want us to feel grateful to you for suffering 
on our behalf?”’ Unlike the older generation that negotiates transnational identities, the 
sense of belonging experienced by the later generations is not oriented towards Southeast 
Asia anymore. However, it is would be incorrect to claim that their sense of belonging is 
rooted in China because interactions and interviews with the younger generation suggest 
that even in China they experience rootlessness as they seek direction in their lives. As 
Zhou28 notes of the children of Vietnamese refugees in America:  
Most the refugees lack education, job skills, and measurable economic resources. 
They also suffered from the trauma of war and flight and from the severe emotional 
distress that they experienced at refugee camps… The parents’ low socioeconomic 
status makes it difficult for the children to succeed, even though both parents and 
children desperately want to get ahead.29 
The same can be said of the children of the refugee-returnees who grew up in rural China. 
Even though their parents received state assistance when resettling in China, their 
families remain impoverished. The younger generation generally have low levels of 
educational achievement.30 Those who move to the cities are doubly excluded from the 
urban population because, first, their forced migration family histories disadvantage them 
as a group within Chinese society that arrived with few resources, both materially as well 
as by way of human capital. Second, their rural backgrounds identify them as a ‘caste’31 
group in urban China. The social capital that they have through chain migration networks 
limits them to the blue-collar jobs in which their fellow villagers are employed in at the 
cities.  
                                                
26 Diane Wolf, ‘There’s no place like “home”: Emotional transnationalism and the struggles of second-
generation Filipinos’ in Peggy Levitt and Mary C. Waters, The Changing Face of Home: The 
Transnational Lives of the Second Generation, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2009, pp. 255-294. 
27 Wolf, There’s no place like ‘home’, p. 285. 
28 Min Zhou, ‘Straddling different worlds: The acculturation of Vietnamese refugee children’, in R.G. 
Rumbaut and A. Portes, Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America, Berkeley, L. A. and London, 
University of California Press, 2001, pp. 187-227. 
29 Zhou, Straddling different worlds, p. 188. 
30 This observation is corroborated by Han’s (2013) study of the Vietnamese refugees that were resettled in 
China. He notes that, ‘the lack of education and skills has made it difficult for [the refugees] to venture into 
non-agricultural sectors of the conomy. When the reform of the state farms started to threaten the existence 
of their farms… many of them felt inadequate and became distraught’ (ibid, 42); Han Xiaorong, Exiled to 
the ancestral land: The resettlement, stratification and assimilation of the refugees from Vietnam in China, 
International Journal of Asian Studies, 10, 1, 2013, pp. 25-46.  
31 Han, Policing and racialisation of rural migrant workers in Chinese cities, pp. 596-597. 
 14 
 
The passage of time leads to forgotten forced migration histories and in conjunction with 
language and other assimilation processes, the Southeast Asian cultures featured as 
multiculturalism in the farm are fast becoming little more than kitsch displays of ‘cultural 
exoticism’32 for tourism consumption. Alongside this, inter-marriage trends are common 
between the progeny of the refugee-returnees and the locally born Chinese from 
neighbouring villages or the new internal migrants from other parts of China, resulting in 
the later generations becoming increasingly distanced from their Southeast Asian 
heritage.  
 
There is, however, an added dimension to the socially complex trends described above. A 
number of the earlier out-migrants deployed by the Qiaoban to work in the cities 
continue to cherish the memories they have of growing up in the farms and the cultural 
identity associated with the overseas Chinese farms. This group  that settled in the cities 
have limited personal ties and contact with the Southeast Asian countries in which their 
parents claim belonging. However, they filter claims to transnational identities by 
invoking the labels, guiqiao or huaqiao, selectively. To emphasise the patriotism 
associated with their parents’ decision to return to China, they lay claim to a guiqiao 
(returnee) identity while downplaying the forced migration histories prompting return by 
the nanqiao (refugees). To highlight their distinctive cultural identities fomented from 
growing up on the overseas Chinese farms populated by Southeast Asian communities, 
they claim to be huaqiao (overseas Chinese) even though they have not lived overseas 
personally before. What these observations attest to are the slippery ways in which the 
categories of huaqiao, guiqiao and nanqiao have been used historically and even in 
contemporary times; this is what Spivak33 terms as ‘strategic essentialism’ but with a 
Chinese twist.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper considered the way that transnationalism, multiculturalism and assimilation 
processes co-exist in tension in contemporary China. The historical forced migration of 
Chinese co-ethnics from Southeast Asia and their resettlement in China are a 
phenomenon little known outside of Mainland China. But their experiences provide a 
useful analytical lens for understanding the resilience of transnational identities in the 
lives of forced migrants more generally. The case of China, however, also demonstrates 
how state planners capitalise upon the distinctive cultural identities of the refugee-
returnees to market the farms as multiculturalism communities for tourism as a result of 
wider economic reforms in Chinese society. The end-result is a semblance of 
multiculturalism that is trivialised and disassociated from the everyday experiences of the 
refugee-returnees, some of whom bear racist attitudes covertly towards their fellow 
villagers.  
 
This paper also moves the focus of integration and assimilation debates away from the 
existing scholarship on Chinese immigrants based in North American, European and 
                                                
32 Yang et al., Ethnic tourism development, pp. 753. 
33 Gayatri Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine, New York, Routledge, 1993. 
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Southeast Asian experiences. The paper further enlarges debate on majority/minority 
relations in China to examine critically the nuanced social differences observable within 
the category recognised as Han Chinese through the return migration experiences of co-
ethnics born and raised abroad (guiqiao). The guiqiao had adopted the cultural habits and 
language of their host societies in Southeast Asia, which sets them apart from the China-
born Chinese. The objectification and commodification of their guiqiao identities for 
domestic tourism serve to normalize the culture of the locally born Chinese and assert a 
new national narrative of contemporary China that is distinct from the overseas Chinese 
identity. 
 
The discussion of the second and third generations signals that the younger generations 
are experiencing assimilation processes. Amongst the second generation that had been 
deployed by the state in earlier years to work in the cities, a sustained period of time 
away from the farms triggers nostalgia that materialises as efforts to maintain the 
transnational identities of their parents. However, the cultural practices they retain are 
limited by the lack of personal immersion in the Southeast Asian cultures their parents 
knew well. For them and their children in the third generation, claims to huaqiao and 
guiqiao identities are situationally invoked but their identity framings can be more 
appropriately described as anchored in and filtered by their experiences of growing up in 
the overseas Chinese farms, rather than an overseas experience in itself.  
 
As for those that moved to Chinese cities independently when internal migration controls 
were lifted, the research suggests that they experience a rootlessness arising from their 
doubly disadvantaged rural and forced migration backgrounds. Their low educational 
levels coupled with the dynamics of chain migration networks that trap them to low-
paying casual labour jobs limits their upward social mobility. This paper thus suggests 
that further research can be conducted to study the lives of the younger generation that is 
considered guiguo huaqiao (returnees from abroad) but whose experiences are inflected 
by the intersection of forced migration family histories, bi-cultural backgrounds, class 
subjectivities and rural. Moreover, as China opens its doors to new immigration, other 
types of Chinese diasporic descendants are arriving (or ‘returning’) to study, work live in 
the ancestral homeland. Their identity negotiations as persons of Chinese ethnicity born 
abroad but who are more removed from the nation-building project of contemporary 
China and its assimilation inclinations provide new research avenues for overseas 
Chinese studies and will help develop a better understanding of China in transition 
 
